conception of autonomy, at least as a political norm, is much closer to Galston's "expressive liberty" than to Crowder's "individual autonomy."
Before proceeding further, I should emphasize that the toleration-autonomy debate is not merely a "family dispute" about some fine points of liberal theory. On the contrary, the outcome of this dispute has dramatic implications for societies where deep religious and cultural differences are either well-entrenched (say, the U.S.) or growing at a fast rate (say, France or Germany). If we adopt a tolerationist stance, social groups and social infrastructures (e.g. schools, hospitals, businesses) devoted to tradition-based ways of life involving, say, arranged marriages, intellectual submission to religious authority, some form of patriarchal social structure, and the limited exposure of members to "alternative ways of life," may be permitted to exist and reproduce themselves, albeit against the backdrop of a liberal juridical and economic order that includes freedom of association. If, on the other hand, we adopt a pro-autonomy stance, the State and its agents may be authorized to control, either through legal rules or educational policies or both, the internal practices of associations-and presumably, of families-to ensure that their members develop an adequate capacity for personal autonomy, albeit in a prudent and even-handed manner.
2

From the Right of Exit to Autonomy
Crowder attempts to draw pro-autonomy conclusions from Galston's pro-toleration assumptions, specifically the right of exit and the premise of value pluralism. On the right of exit, Galston insists that members of nonliberal association enjoy an "enforceable right of exit" (127), 3 meaning in the first place that they are not physically coerced to stay put in any particular association. But freedom of association for Galston is not merely a matter of freedom from physical coercion: he maintains that a group may not legitimately Page 3 of 10 "disempower" its members from living outside of itself, and that a group may not legitimately keep its members within "a kind of mental and moral prison" (128). 4 So clearly,
Galston is concerned about forms of environmental or cognitive manipulation that effectively disable people's capacity to choose to leave an association.
Crowder wastes no time in exploiting Galston's appeal to a seemingly positive ideal of freedom. If group acts that disempower (mental) freedom are a problem, he asks, "doesn't that mean that to count as genuinely free to exit, one must be empowered to do so-that is, one must have the positive capacity to overcome [informational, economic, and psychological] obstacles to exit?...Crucially,…real freedom of exit seems to involve the capacity to stand back from the group's norms and to assess them critically-that is, the capacity for autonomous judgement" (128).
Galston seems eager to disavow any commitment to an "Enlightenment" ideal of autonomy, while expressing concern about potential attacks on an agent's mental freedom.
Since he elaborates surprisingly little on his own "moderate" conception of autonomy, it is understandable that Crowder assumes that he is secretly smuggling in a more "empowering,"
"Enlightenment" ideal, which would naturally include mental freedom and the capacity to reflect on one's way of life as a whole. But this conclusion is too hasty, for there is a very big jump indeed from not being kept by others in a "a kind of mental and moral prison," to possessing a fully developed, immediately exercisable capacity to "overcome obstacles to exit." While Galston's "moderate autonomy" is insufficiently elaborated, for now I just want to show that the kind of autonomy Galston gestures towards need not be anything as demanding as the kind inferred by Crowder. defined by her roles as wife, mother, and Muslim" (127). 5 The mere fact of "acquiescence" in her lifestyle, Crowder suggests, is not sufficient to underpin a right of exit: "The fact that no one is forcing Fatima to stay is consistent with her having no realistic prospect of leaving because of obstacles other than simple coercion. These include the costs that are often attached to exit, including economic and psychological costs, the risks of failure in the society into which one is exiting, lack of economic resources with which to make exit possible if one has decided in that direction, and…the kind of social conditioning that makes exit unimaginable in the first place" (127).
But this conception of autonomy, however empowering, seems an implausibly stringent requirement: first, it fails to distinguish between morally unacceptable restrictions Third, Crowder implausibly assumes that the right of exit is not really available to someone for whom exit imposes an unacceptable psychological cost. But surely this cannot be right: to say that someone has a right to exit her association is not by any means to say that for her, the costs of exit are acceptable or psychologically feasible. It is one thing to grant someone an opportunity, quite another to say that the corresponding outcome is subjectively affordable to her, given her unique history, attachments, and psychological profile. Setting aside perhaps certain extreme cases of "mental imprisonment" (following Galston), which might call for corrective action by the State, it is hardly the business of the State to make exit from associations psychologically feasible for group members. Citizens are entitled to participate in forms of association that engage their minds and hearts so deeply that exit is "unthinkable" to them. For example, a religious believer is legally free to dissociate from her church, but that does not mean that she will be psychologically disposed, or even capable, of doing so. Such is the nature of many human commitments, and I see no reason to think that such commitments are therefore insidious, wicked, or inconsistent with human freedom. It is only if we accept an implausibly demanding ideal of autonomy, which unshackles humans from deep, life-changing, or psychologically compelling commitments, that Crowder's view of autonomy gains plausibility.
From value pluralism to autonomy
Finally, let us consider Crowder's attempt to make a case for autonomy-based liberalism based on the doctrine of value pluralism. According to value pluralism, "there are many objective and intrinsic goods-that is, goods that are valuable for their own sake as components of human well-being" (132), and these goods have two features: first, they are Page 7 of 10 incommensurable in the sense that they cannot be reduced to a single rational scale or measure; and second, given differences in temperament, intellect, character, culture, and circumstance, there is no uniquely or universally optimal way of combining goods within a human life. Finally, value pluralists assume that a good society will afford its members real opportunities for personal flourishing, and will value their "expressive liberty," viz. their ability to "[lead] their lives as they see fit, within a broad range of legitimate variation, in accordance with their own understanding of what gives life meaning and value" (124). 6 With these premises in place, Galston extends the principle of toleration to nonliberal ways of life,
arguing that "from a value-pluralist standpoint, there are many valuable ways of life, individual and collective, that are not autonomous in the sense that they are not the product of conscious reflection and choice but, rather, of habit, tradition, authority, or unswerving faith" (133). 7 Crowder accepts all of the premises of this argument, with some modifications, but rejects Galston's tolerationist conclusion. He argues, on the contrary, that respect for the plurality of human goods uniquely favors associations that both support individual autonomy (and are thus liberal by tendency 8 ) and enable their members to "pursue a multiplicity of goods and personal projects, either interpreting the culture in new or different ways, or transforming it" (135). The basic thrust of Crowder's argument is that just as a liberal regime ought to provide social space for a rich array of lifestyles and goods conducive to different forms of human flourishing, the cultures within a regime ought to provide social space for a rich array of "goods and personal projects" that can be tailored to individuals' circumstances.
But then, it would appear to follow that we should equip each person, whatever her cultural The main purpose of this article has been to point out some serious difficulties with
Crowder's argument for strong autonomy, not to develop an alternative conception.
Therefore, I have not defined the precise sort of autonomy individuals ought to enjoy in a liberal regime. However, I would like to conclude with a couple of intimations in this regard.
Now, on Galston's own admission, some form of freedom or "expressive liberty" is essential to a good life. Crowder seems to assume that liberal autonomy is the only viable option here.
But is it? It seems to me that Galston's notion of expressive liberty provides at least the basis for a viable alternative. Recall that expressive liberty is the ability to live one's life in accordance with one's understanding of what gives life meaning and value. There are two considerations that prevent this conception from collapsing into liberal autonomy: first, acting on one's understanding of meaning and value, and doing so in a way that enriches one's life, by no means presupposes that one has canvassed a wide array of options beyond those presented by one's tradition and upbringing. Second, as value pluralists are well aware, there is no cost-free social arrangement. Though the toleration of nonliberal cultures will inevitably result in some people living less satisfying and successful lives than they might live in a society liberal "all the way down," even greater social and moral losses would likely accrue from attempts by the state to rearrange the internal practices of associations in accordance with a doctrine of Enlightenment autonomy.
